Fear and Deprivation in Trump's America: A Regional Analysis of Voting Behavior in the 2016 and 2020 U.S. Presidential Elections

Since Trump was elected U.S. President in 2016, researchers have sought to explain his support, with some focusing on structural factors (e.g., economics) and others focusing on psychological factors (e.g., negative emotions). We integrate these perspectives in a regional analysis of 18+ structural variables capturing economic, demographic, and health factors as well as the aggregated neuroticism scores of 3+ million individuals. Results revealed that regions that voted for Trump in 2016 and 2020 had high levels of neuroticism and economic deprivation. Regions that voted for Trump also had high anti-Black implicit bias and low ethnic diversity, though Trump made gains in ethnically diverse regions in 2020. Trump's voter base differed from the voter base of more traditional Republican candidates and Democrat Bernie Sanders. In sum, structural and psychological factors both explain Trump's unique authoritarian appeal. What is the study's background? Regions differ on many important psychological, economic, demographic, and health-related dimensions. Investigating these dimensions can inform our understanding of the nature of regional differences and their implications for consequential political behaviors like voting. Why was this study done? We analyzed characteristics of more than 2,080 counties to see whether support for Donald Trump in the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections was concentrated in certain kinds of regions. Importantly, we considered a wide array of psychological and structural factors, which have typically been examined independently in the voting literature. In doing so, we provide a multi-faceted portrait of the roots of regional Trump support and how his voter base differs from that of other Republican and Democratic candidates. What did the researchers find? Our analyses uncover four central findings. The first is that regions high on neuroticism—whose populations are more prone to experiencing negative emotions, like fear and anxiety—were more likely to vote for Trump. The robustness of this finding reveals a strong emotional basis for Trump support and suggests that enduring aspects of personality explain voting behavior beyond the effects of other factors. The second major finding is that economically deprived regions were more likely to vote for Trump. These economically deprived regions were characterized by low college attainment, low income, high levels of manufacturing and agriculture, etc. However, the economically deprived regions voting for Trump were not the very poorest regions in the U.S. The very poorest regions tended to be ethnically diverse and voted for the Democratic presidential candidates (i.e., Clinton in 2016 and Biden in 2020). Our third major finding is that Trump-supporting regions had low levels of ethnic diversity and high levels of anti-Black implicit bias. This finding shows that purely economic accounts of Trump support that do not take race and racism into account are incomplete. Interestingly, however, Trump gained more support in ethnically diverse regions over time. He performed better in ethnically diverse regions in 2020 than he did in 2016, even though ethnically diverse regions still preferred Democratic candidates overall. Trump's performance also improved in other kinds of regions, like regions with poor health. He made gains in these regions in 2016 and 2020, even though regions with poor health still preferred Democratic candidates overall. Our last major set of findings concerns important differences between Trump's voter base and the voter base of other Republican and Democratic candidates. Trump made gains in 2016 over Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney's performance in 2012 in regions high on neuroticism and economic deprivation, and low on ethnic diversity, showing Trump's unique appeal in these regions. There was some overlap in the characteristics of regions that voted for Trump and those that voted for rival Republican primary candidate Ted Cruz and Democratic primary candidate Bernie Sanders. However, there was no overlap between the characteristics of regions that voted for Trump and those that voted for more traditional Republican primary candidates like John Kasich and Marco Rubio. Thus, Trump seemed to have a unique authoritarian appeal unshared by most of his rivals, a view that is bolstered by additional evidence that regions that voted for Trump tended to score high on measures of right-wing authoritarianism. What do these findings mean? In sum, the tendency to experience negative emotionality (i.e., neuroticism) and the objective economic, demographic, and health conditions of one's environment are jointly associated with voting behavior in nuanced ways. The more general picture, however, is that fear and deprivation characterize Trump's America. Relevance Statement We shed light on the psychological and structural roots of Donald Trump's unique authoritarian appeal in a large-scale regional analysis of voting behavior in 2016 and 2020, highlighting the importance of personality, economics, ethnic diversity, and health. Key Insights More neurotic regions voted for Trump in 2016 and 2020. Economically deprived regions voted for Trump in 2016 and 2020. Low ethnic diversity and high implicit bias predicted Trump voting. Trump's voter base differed from that of other candidates. Psychological and structural factors are both related to Trump voting.

gains in 2016 over Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney's performance in 2012 in regions high on neuroticism and economic deprivation, and low on ethnic diversity, showing Trump's unique appeal in these regions. There was some overlap in the characteristics of regions that voted for Trump and those that voted for rival Republican primary candidate Ted Cruz and Democratic primary candidate Bernie Sanders. However, there was no overlap between the characteristics of regions that voted for Trump and those that voted for more traditional Republican primary candidates like John Kasich and Marco Rubio. Thus, Trump seemed to have a unique authoritarian appeal unshared by most of his rivals, a view that is bolstered by additional evidence that regions that voted for Trump tended to score high on measures of right-wing authoritarianism.

What do these findings mean?
In sum, the tendency to experience negative emotionality (i.e., neuroticism) and the objec tive economic, demographic, and health conditions of one's environment are jointly associ ated with voting behavior in nuanced ways. The more general picture, however, is that fear and deprivation characterize Trump's America.

Relevance Statement
We shed light on the psychological and structural roots of Donald Trump's unique authoritarian appeal in a large-scale regional analysis of voting behavior in 2016 and 2020, highlighting the importance of personality, economics, ethnic diversity, and health. Since Donald Trump's election as U.S. President in 2016, researchers have sought to understand the roots of his support. This interest stems in part from perceptions that Trump is both a symptom and cause of democratic decline. Since Trump's election, the most respected reports on democratic performance have all documented signs of democratic erosion in the U.S. In 2016, The Economist Group demoted the United States from the category of "full democracy" to "flawed democracy" (Haynie, 2017). A Bright Line Watch survey of more than a thousand political scientists showed that they believe democratic principles to be on "sharp decline under the Trump administration" (Carey et al., 2019, p. 701). 1 The Varieties of Democracy project-which catalogues countries' performance on more than 400 democratic indicators (Coppedge et al., 2011)-no longer ranks the United States in the top 10% of liberal democracies, "in part as a consequence of President Trump's repeated attacks on the media, opposition politicians, and the sub stantial weakening of… checks and balances on executive power" (Alizada et al., 2021, p. 38). Trump's rise in the United States is part of a broader recent trend around the world, wherein citizens vote in large numbers for leaders who display authoritarian tendencies (Haggard & Kaufman, 2021;Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018;Maerz et al., 2020;Schenkkan & Repucci, 2019).

Key Insights
If the appeal of authoritarian leaders is on the rise, then it makes sense to turn to theories of authoritarianism for an explanation. Foundational and modern theories of authoritarianism contend that leaders like Trump win support from people experiencing feelings of threat (Adorno et al., 1950;Altemeyer, 1998;Duckitt & Fisher, 2003;Fromm, 1941;Jost et al., 2003). According to this view, such people are particularly susceptible to appeals from authoritarian leaders who speak to their fears and promise to eradicate threats. Feelings of threat can come from both external sources (e.g., economic, demo graphic conditions) and internal sources (e.g., psychological dispositions). We turn first to external sources of threat.
Many studies have found evidence, including causal evidence, for the role of econom ic threat on authoritarian support. Regions that experienced more automation and trade competition with China were more likely than other regions to vote for Trump in 2016, to vote for far-right parties in Europe, and to have authoritarian values (Anelli, Colantone, & Stanig, 2021;Autor et al., 2020;Ballard-Rosa et al., 2018;Ballard-Rosa et al., 2021;Frey, Berger, & Chen, 2018;Im et al., 2019). Economic threats were especially likely to increase support for Trump in majority-white regions (Autor et al., 2020) and also to increase negative sentiments against immigrants (Gamez-Djokic & Waytz, 2020). Other research has similarly found that support from the white working class was crucial to securing Trump's victory (Grimmer & Marble, 2019;Morgan & Lee, 2018Zingher, 2020).
These findings suggest that Trump's popularity is not just a matter of economics; his popularity is caused by perceived threats to white people's status in an increasing ly ethnically diverse United States (Knowles & Tropp, 2018;Major, Blodorn, & Major Blascovich, 2018;Mutz, 2018). When people lose status, they engage in more extreme political strategies to assert their group's dominance (Petersen, Osmundsen, & Bor, 2021). For instance, concerns about the political power of immigrants, African Americans, and Latinos strongly predicted Republicans' endorsement of anti-democratic norms (Bartels, 1) This report also shows that Trump supporters and detractors make different evaluations of American democratic performance. Moreover, the public's views of American democratic performance diverge when it comes to which democratic principles are under threat. For instance, a majority of experts believe that American elections are free of pervasive fraud, but this view is not shared by the majority of the public (Carey et al., 2019). authoritarianism more strongly among people low on openness (Armendáriz Miranda, 2021).
Despite this empirical and theoretical precedent, research taking an interactionist ap proach to accounting for political behavior remains rare. 2 The vast majority of research investigating Trump support considers either psychological factors or structural factors. No research, to our knowledge, has examined the interactive effects of these factors on Trump support. Moreover, past research tends to focus on just a few structural variables rather than considering structural conditions more holistically. Our paper addresses these gaps by analyzing the multi-faceted structural and psychological roots of Trump voting.
In exploratory and confirmatory analyses of the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections, we test the independent effects of psychological and structural factors, as well as their additive and interactive effects, on voting behavior at the regional level. We probe the generality of our findings across two regional levels of analysis (counties and Core-Based Statistical Areas) and address problems unique to spatial analyses (by accounting for differences in population density, variance shared between regions in the same state, and similarity between neighboring regions). We capture the general struc tural conditions of a region by factor analyzing an array of publicly available variables, which yielded three factors per region reflecting economic deprivation, ethnic diversity, and health disadvantage. We capture the prevalence of negative emotionality in a region by aggregating the neuroticism scores of more than three million individuals according to the regions in which they live.
In all our analyses, we compare the effects of regional neuroticism to the effects of other personality traits, which have also been found to predict political attitudes. In addition, we benchmark the effects of our focal psychological and structural variables against other implicit and explicit variables that reflect a desire for group-based dom inance (i.e., social-dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, implicit racial and gender bias), which have been shown to predict status threat and voting in past research (e.g., Greenwald et al. 2009;Mutz 2018). To investigate the possibility that neuroticism and threatening structural factors are uniquely associated with right-wing voting behavior, we examine whether these variables predict voting for 2016 Democratic primary candidate Bernie Sanders, who purportedly shared Trump's populist voter base according to popular media accounts (White, 2016) and academic analyses (Staufer, 2021). To investigate the possibility that neuroticism and threatening structural factors are uniquely associated with right-wing authoritarian voting behavior, we examine whether these variables predict voting for 2016 Republican primary who displayed more tradi 2) A related but distinct tradition of research examines how threatening situations (usually manipulated in the lab) interact with other individual differences (e.g., authoritarianism, not basic traits) to predict political behavior and attitudes (e.g., Feldman & Stenner, 1997;Marcus et al., 2005). tional and less authoritarian tendencies than Trump (i.e., Marco Rubio, John Kasich, and Ted Cruz). To investigate changes in the Republican voter base over time, we examine whether neuroticism and threatening structural factors predict Trump's gains in 2016 over Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney's performance in 2012, as well as Trump's gains in 2020 over his performance in 2016.

Method
The method used to examine the 2016 and 2020 elections were identical, except that the structural and voting data were collected in different years. All data sources are described in Table 1. In addition, the method, analyses, and hypotheses for the 2020 election were pre-registered on OSF. 3 Sample size was determined based on data availa bility. The Online Supplementary Materials are available at https://osf.io/4fzga. These supplementary materials include additional methodological details (regarding the data, quality checks, exclusions, etc.) and additional results (regarding the factor analyses, CBSA analyses, spatial autocorrelation, and weighting for representativeness robustness checks). Data and code are also available in the Supplementary Materials. Factor analyses were conducted using R version 4.0.0; regression analyses were conducted using Stata version 15.1. We report the following deviations from our pre-registration. First, our pre-registration mistakenly stated that all variables would be standardized prior to being used in analyses. Only the independent variables were standardized. Second, we used Bureau of Economic Analysis population density data and the Federal Communications Commission internet data instead of the American Community Survey's data because we wanted to use 1-year estimates where possible (rather than ACS's 5-year estimates). Third, the income ratio described in the pre-registration is the same as that included in the main manuscript, but we describe the 90th income percentile as "the bottom 10% of earners. " Fourth, we did not mention weighting personality traits for representativeness as an additional test of robustness. Fifth, we did not anticipate the voting data exclusions due to lack of data availability in the pre-registration. Finally, the analyses of group-based dominance variables (i.e., SDO, RWA, race IAT, gender-career IAT) as well as analyses of Kasich, Rubio, and Cruz primary votes were conducted in response to reviewer comments and thus were not pre-registered.  (John & Srivastava, 1999); BMI = Body Mass Index; IAT = Implicit Association Test. All variables except voting, personality, and group-based dominance were included in our factor analyses as indicators of regional economic, demographic, and health conditions.

Regional Level and Spatial Analysis Considerations
The main unit of analysis is the county level, which we supplement with analyses at the Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSA) level for reasons we describe below. Each CBSA is a metropolitan area composed of one or more counties: an urban core and its surrounding commuting territory. Spatial analyses require unique analytical considerations. First, these analyses require appropriate geographic control variables. We control for population density because voters in rural regions with low population density tend to vote for conservative candi dates. We also control for state-fixed effects by including state dummies that account for variance shared between regions in the same state, including any omitted confound ing variables at the state level. It is particularly important to account for state-fixed effects in election research because election laws and procedures that differ from state to state could influence the results. Second, we must anticipate potential violation of the statistical assumption that error terms will be uncorrelated because neighboring regions are non-independent (Griffith, 1987). We address this concern (i.e., spatial auto correlation) by conducting additional analyses that add spatial lags to our models using Stata's "spregress" command (StataCorp., 2017). 4 Third, we conduct analyses at both the county and CBSA levels to address the potential modifiable area unit problem (MAUP), wherein one's findings depend on the choice of the geographical unit (Ebert et al., 2022;Openshaw & Taylor, 1979).

Personality Data
Personality data come from the Gosling-Potter Internet Personality Project's most recent dataset, collected from 2003 to 2015 from participants who voluntarily completed person ality surveys on the website www.outofservice.com in exchange for feedback about their personality. The data collection was declared exempt from informed consent by the approval of the Institutional Review Board at the University of Texas at Austin because there were no significant risks to participants (IRB #2004-10-0073). A partial list of papers that have used Gosling-Potter Internet Personality Project data can be found at http://www.thebigfiveproject.com/published-papers. We aggregated the individual-level personality scores (N = 3,167,041) to the county (N = 2,083) and CBSA (N = 923) levels based on where participants reported living. Only counties and CBSAs with at least 100 participants per region were included in our analyses. As the independent variable in our analyses, we focus on neuroticism (α = 0.79) as compared to and controlling for the other personality traits most strongly related to voting behavior in prior research: conscientiousness (α = 0.80) and openness (α = 0.74). These personality traits were measured using the 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI-44; John & Srivastava, 1999). We address the (non-)representativeness of the sample by conducting robustness checks in which we weight individual respondents by age and gender to make the personality dataset more representative of the U.S. population.
For our dependent variable, we focus on three measures of voting behavior. The first measure is Trump's simple two-party vote share in 2016 and 2020. Vote share was calculated by taking the raw votes for Trump in each region as a proportion of the combined votes for Trump and the Democratic candidate in each region during the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections. This measure ignores third-party votes. The second measure is Trump's gains beyond the Republican presidential candidate in the previous election. This measure captures the degree to which regions shifted their vote share to 4) We conducted this robustness check out of an abundance of caution. We actually did not observe problematic spatial autocorrelation as indicated by non- Trump in 2016 from Romney's vote share in 2012 ("2016 Trump gains") and to Trump in 2020 from his own initial vote share in 2016 ("2020 Trump gains"). For example, if Trump won 40% of the vote in 2016 and 45% in 2020, his gains from 2016 to 2020 would be 5%-points. Obviously, the size of Trump's gain corresponds to the size of the Democrats' loss. Note that the manuscript reports that Trump's mean two-party vote share is much greater than 50% in both elections, even though he did not win the popular vote in either election. This is because the mean vote share takes the mean across counties rather than individuals, and there are more rural counties (where Trump's vote share is very high) than urban counties.
The third category of voting behavior captures the vote share of other 2016 Demo cratic and Republican primary candidates', which we compare to Trump's 2016 primary vote share. Analyzing primary election results allows us to investigate the alleged com mon appeal of Trump and left-wing populist Bernie Sanders as well as whether Trump's voter base was similar to that of more traditional Republican candidates. We focused on the primary candidates who were arguably Trump's biggest competition: Bernie Sanders on the Democratic side and John Kasich, Ted Cruz, and Marco Rubio on the Republican side. Although there were other Republican primary candidates in 2016, none received more than 3% of the popular vote.
Sanders's primary vote share was calculated as the percentage of votes cast for him out of all primary votes cast for candidates of his party in a given region. Put differently, Sanders's vote share was calculated as the percentage of votes cast for Sanders out of all votes cast for both Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton in the Democratic primary because all other 2016 Democratic primary candidates withdrew before or shortly after the primary season began. The vote share for each primary Republican candidates was calculated as the percentage of votes cast for that candidate out of the total number of votes for all four candidates combined (Trump, Kasich, Rubio, and Cruz). We did not consider votes for Bernie Sanders in the 2020 Democratic primary elections because the political landscape had shifted from 2016 such that there were multiple Democratic candidates in 2020 (e.g., Elizabeth Warren) who were running on what might be con sidered left-wing populist platforms. We did not consider votes for other Republican primary candidates in 2020 because, as sitting president, Donald Trump was the de facto Republican nominee. Table 1 includes 18 variables broadly capture regional economic, demographic, and health-related conditions in 2016 and 2020. 5 We factor analyzed these variables to derive factor scores for each region, which were saved and used as variables in our regression 5) As is evident from Table 1, data from 2020 was not yet available for many economic, demographic, and health variables of interest. In such cases, we use data from the most recent year available, usually 2019. analyses. We elaborate on the rationale and procedure for our factor analytic approach below. Enders and Uscinski (2021) also describe a detailed rationale for examining a broad "profile" of factors when modeling Trump support.

Economic, Demographic, and Health Data
Using factor scores as indicators of economic, demographic, and health conditions allows us to address several concerns. Every variable has strengths and weaknesses when it comes to representing a construct of interest. Per capita income may be a good indicator of people's absolute buying power in a given region, whereas unemployment may be a good indicator of the health of the region's job market. Both variables provide important information about a region's economic conditions. Relying on a diversity of sources and measures also helps diminish the influence of limitations, errors, or biases in any individual source's data. To avoid arbitrarily choosing one variable over another, one could include all relevant variables that might plausibly be related to regional economics, demographics, and health in regression analyses. However, this method presents challenges, such as multicollinearity in analyses that include highly correlated variables, a large number of coefficients to interpret, and ambiguity around how to inter pret theoretically related variables that yield contradictory results. The factor analytic approach allows us to avoid these issues while characterizing regions' general economic, demographic, and health-related conditions. Therefore, we conducted exploratory factor analyses for 2016 and 2020 at both re gional levels. Before conducting each factor analysis, we consulted a scree plot which suggested that three factors had an eigen value > 1 (Kaiser, 1960) and might parsi moniously reflect our structural constructs of interest: economics, demographics, and health. We then conducted a factor analysis specifying three factors, maximum likeli hood estimation, median imputation (to account for missing data unbiased by extreme scores), oblimin rotation (to allow for correlated factors), and the tenBerge method (to estimate correlation-preserving factor scores) using the "fa" function in the "psych" R package (Revelle, 2021, Version 1.9.12.31) and the "GPA rotation" R package (Bernaards & Jennrich, 2005, Version 2014. Results of the 2016 and 2020 county-level factor analyses are reported in Table 2. Note. Bolded values represent factor loadings ≥ |.40|. All factors were positively correlated with each other. Regions that scored high on the first factor, which we call economic deprivation, had low rates of college education, low income, low levels of migration and income inequality, lacked Internet access, had a high share of agriculture/mining industries, and high obesi ty. These economically deprived regions tend to be rural, as indicated by the factor's negative correlation (r = -.17) with population density. Importantly, regions that scored high on this factor were not the very poorest regions, since variables like poverty and unemployment did not load strongly on this factor. Instead, regions that scored strongly on the first factor are rural regions that probably used to drive the American economy (e.g., with manufacturing and agriculture) but are no longer doing as well (Eriksson et al., 2021;Low, 2021). Employment share in agriculture and manufacturing have been shrinking in number and value for several decades, leading to socioeconomic distress in counties in the Rust Belt and the Midwest. Therefore, we describe this factor using the word "deprivation, " which is synonymous with "loss, " to reflect these regions' loss of economic dominance.
Regions that scored high on the second factor, which we call ethnic diversity, had more ethnic diversity, high school dropouts, teen births, poverty, and uninsured people. This factor most likely captures the Black and Hispanic ethnic makeup of a region because these populations account for about twice as many high school dropouts, teen births, uninsured people, and people in poverty than do White and Asian populations, according to the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES, 2019), the Centers for Disease Control (CDC, 2019), and the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF, 2019a(KFF, , 2019b. The fact that this factor includes uninsured and high school dropouts shows that communi ties of color disproportionately lack access to healthcare and education. Similarly, the fact that, in 2016, poverty and unemployment load strongly on this factor shows how racialized lack of economic opportunity is in the U.S. This factor was uncorrelated with population density, suggesting that it captures ethnic diversity in both urban and rural settings. Regions that scored high on the third factor, which we call health disadvantage, had higher smoking rates, more reported poor physical health days, and more babies born underweight. Using the most stringent significance threshold, this factor was unrelated to population density, suggesting that health disadvantage can be found in both urban and rural regions. The fact that this factor includes poverty (which also loaded strongly on the ethnic diversity factor in 2016) and obesity (which also loaded strongly on the economic deprivation factor) suggests economic, demographic, and health conditions are all intertwined. One benefit of taking a data-driven inductive approach to factor analysis is that it reveals these kinds of interdependencies.
Indeed, correlations between the factors show that regions that were economically deprived also tended to have greater ethnic diversity and worse health. In 2016, the economic deprivation and ethnic diversity factors were positively correlated (r = .18), the economic deprivation and health disadvantage factors were positively correlated (r = .48), and the ethnic diversity and health disadvantage factors were positively cor related (r = .44). In 2020, the economic deprivation and ethnic diversity factors were correlated (r = .10), the economic and health factors were correlated (r = .45), and the ethnic diversity and health disadvantage factors were correlated (r = .42).

Group-Based Dominance Data
The ethnic diversity factor provides a good sense of the objective demographic condi tions of a region, but it does not reflect how people perceive or feel about minorities and other historically marginalized groups. Negative subjective attitudes towards minorities were considered core to the original conceptualization of the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950) and have more recently been shown to be strong predictors of Trump support (Bartels, 2018;Mason, Wronski, & Kane, 2021) and anti-democratic ten dencies (Bartels, 2020). Similarly, some research has found that sexism against Hillary, which was not accounted for in our structural factors, was related to Trump voting (Ratliff et al., 2019). Accounting for regional differences in such attitudes may be as important as accounting for the actual demographic makeup of a region because it is possible that two counties have similar demographics, but one of these counties has less bias (e.g., due to higher levels of intergroup contact). More generally, and as previously mentioned, threats to one's group are not experienced in absolute terms but rather in relation to one's standing relative to other groups. In support of this idea, prior work has demonstrated that psychological factors that capture a preference for one's own group to dominate or aggress against other groups (e.g., social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism) predict individuals' support for Trump (Van Assche, Dhont, & Pettigrew, 2019; Womick et al. 2019).
Therefore, we benchmark the main effects of our focal psychological and structural variables against variables that capture regions' tendency to experience several forms of group-based dominance: social dominance orientation (SDO, N = 690,692, α = .82-.87) 6 , right-wing authoritarianism (RWA, N = 732,347, α = .80-.92), implicit anti-Black bias (race IAT, N = 3,114,109), and implicit gender bias (gender-career IAT, N = 1,039,163). All four group-based dominance variables were accessed from Project Implicit's public datasets, specifically the Race IAT dataset (available at https://osf.io/52qxl/) and Gender-Career IAT dataset (available at https://osf.io/abxq7/) (Xu, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2014). Implicit race and gender bias was assessed by the D measure from the implicit attitudes test (IAT), which captures the speed with which people associate group categories (i.e., race and gender categories) with other words (e.g., "good" vs. "bad"; "career" vs. "fami ly"). RWA was measured from 2007 to 2020 with items such as "Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs" and "Some of the worst people in our country nowadays are those who do not respect our flag, our leaders, and the normal way things are supposed to be done. " SDO was measured from 2006 to 2020 with items like "It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others" and "If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. " Note that, unlike our focal psychological and structural variables, measures of SDO and RWA contain political content, which should make them strong predictors of political behavior like voting. Therefore, accounting for these measures of group-based dominance is a particularly conservative test of other psychological and structural variables' explanatory power.
Moreover, personality traits that were not included in our previous regression mod els-extraversion and agreeableness-may also play a role in people's tendency to aggress against others. People who are willing to denigrate women, minorities, and other groups are likely to be assertive (a facet of extraversion) and lacking in compassion (a facet of agreeableness). Indeed, recent research has linked both agreeableness and extraversion to support for Trump and other populists at the individual level (Bakker, Matthijs, & Gijs, 2016a;Bakker, Schumacher, & Rooduijn, 2021;Bakker, Rooduijn, & Schumacher, 2016b;Fortunato et al., 2018). Thus, we also account for the main effects of extraversion 6) We provide a range of alpha reliabilities for SDO and RWA because different years used different response scales.
We aggregated individual scores on the group-based dominance and personality variables to the county level. We dropped counties that included less than 50 individual observations rather than those with less than 100 individual observations (as was the case in our previous analyses) to increase our total sample of counties. Even so, our final sample size for regressions included group-based dominance variables was about half (N = 1,096) of that used in our focal analyses. Table 3 reports correlations between regional personality traits, structural factors, and voting behavior at the county level. A few correlations are worth pointing out. Regional neuroticism was moderately to strongly associated with voting for Trump in 2016 and 2020 (r = 0.36 and 0.39, ps < .001). Neurotic regions were also those in which Trump experienced gains from 2012 to 2016 and from 2016 to 2020 (r = 0.44 and 0.17, ps < .001). It is also worth noting that neurotic regions experienced greater economic disadvantage in 2016 and 2020 (r = 0.38 and 0.38, ps < .001). Of the structural factors, economic disadvantage was most strongly correlated with Trump votes (r = 0.61 and 0.69; ps < .001) and gains (r = 0.67 and 0.43, ps < .001) in 2016 and 2020, respectively. Interestingly, the ethnic diversity factor showed somewhat different patterns in 2016 and 2020. Less ethnic diversity was associated with Trump gains in 2016 (r = -0.29, p < .001), whereas more ethnic diversity was associated with Trump gains in 2020 (r = 0.35, p < .001). Table 3 Correlations (     Next, we conducted OLS regressions to test the potential direct effect of neuroticism and its interactive effects with structural factors on voting behavior. For each voting outcome (i.e., Trump votes in 2016 and 2020, Trump gains in 2016 and 2020, and primary election votes in 2016), we tested six models. The first model included only the population density covariate and the state-fixed effects. The second model added main effects of the economic, health, and ethnic diversity factors. The third model substituted these three factors for the main effects of neuroticism, openness, and conscientiousness. The fourth model included all personality and structural main effects. The fifth model added our focal interactions between neuroticism and the structural factors (economic deprivation, ethnic diversity, and health disadvantage). The sixth model added interactions between all covariates (openness, conscientiousness, population density) and all three structur al factors. We included these additional terms in the sixth model because including main effects of covariates alone does not properly control for the covariate in models that test interactive effects (Hull, Tedlie, & Lehn, 1992;Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, 2004). The average VIF of Model 6 across predictors and the VIF of main effects (including neuroticism) are unproblematic. Thus the main effects in Model 6 can be interpreted. However, the neuroticism interactions in Model 6 in both the 2016 and 2020 analyses did show problematic VIF, sometimes reaching levels above 60, potentially inflating the standard errors associated with the neuroticism interactions and signaling problematic levels of multi-collinearity. Therefore, we caution against interpreting the neuroticism interactions in Model 6. All independent variables were z-standardized; dependent variables were not stand ardized to ease interpretation of the coefficients. The Breusch-Pagan test revealed het eroscedasticity, which biases the t-statistics and leads to erroneous conclusions about statistical significance. To avoid this problem, we used heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.

Main Effects of Structural Factors and Regional Personality on Trump Voting
Models 1, 2, and 3 evaluated the extent to which regional differences in the regional co variates, personality traits, and structural factors explained voting behavior, respectively. Table 4 presents Trump votes and gains at the county level in 2016. Table 5 presents Trump votes and gains at the county level in 2020. (3) (1) (3) (3) (1) (3) (3) (1) (3) In Model 3, we substituted the three structural factors with three personality traits: neuroticism, conscientiousness, and openness. Compared to the baseline model 1, the traits explained an additional 10-20% of variance in votes for Trump. Our focal traitregional neuroticism-was positively associated with Trump votes and gains in both elections (2016 votes: b = 4.27, p < .001; 2020 votes: b = 4.73, p < .001; 2016 gains: b = 1.75, p < .001; 2020 gains: b = 0.46, p < .001). Consistent with prior work, openness was negatively associated with Trump votes and gains in both elections. Conscientiousness showed weaker relations with voting, positively predicting Trump gains but not Trump votes.
In Model 4, we jointly include the personality traits and structural factors. Most of the results from the Models 2 and 3 stay unchanged except that the neuroticism trait no longer significantly predicts Trump gains in 2020. Additionally, openness and conscientiousness do not consistently predict Trump gains in 2016 and 2020 in this model.

Interactive Effects of Structural Factors and Regional Personality on Trump Voting
Models 5 and 6 investigated interactive effects of the personality traits with each of the three structural factors: economic deprivation, ethnic diversity, and health disadvantage. Model 5 included only the neuroticism interactions with the three structural factors, whereas Model 6 included interaction between all three traits (neuroticism, openness, and conscientiousness) and structural factors (economic deprivation, ethnic diversity, and health disadvantage). Therefore, from the latter model we only discuss the openness and conscientiousness interactions.
The interaction between neuroticism and the economic deprivation factor negatively predicted Trump's vote share in 2016 but positively predicted gains in both elections Taken together, the interactions show the expected pattern: neuroticism tended to exacerbate the strength of the relationship between structural factors and Trump voting. However, size of the interaction coefficients demonstrate that the interaction effects were weak, not explaining much variance in voting beyond main effects of personality and structural factors. Moreover, the interaction effects were not particularly robust across dependent variables (vote share and gains) or after accounting for robustness checks (as summarized in Table 9). Therefore, we focus our interpretation of the results on the large and robust main effects of neuroticism and structural factors on voting. Openness and conscientiousness also interacted with structural factors on votes for Trump, consistent with interactionist theories. We do not interpret these interactions because they also were not particularly robust or consistent, and we did not have specific predictions regarding interactions with other personality traits.

Group-Based Dominance Effects on Trump Voting
As previously mentioned, variables that capture a tendency towards group-based domi nance like right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO) as well as implicit race and gender bias have been shown to be strong predictors of voting for Trump. Similarly, people high in extraversion and low in agreeableness may be par ticularly likely to engage in aggressive behavior. To test these alternative explanations, we regressed Trump vote shares and gains on these variables in Table 6. Model 1 includes RWA, SDO, and the implicit race and gender bias in a model with state fixed effects and population density. Model 2 adds the two remaining Big Five traits, extraversion and agreeableness. Model 3 adds the remaining main effects from our focal analyses (neuroticism, openness, conscientiousness, and structural factors). We do not include interaction effects because our previous analyses show that these were not robust.
Across the three models, implicit anti-Black bias positively predicted Trump vote share in 2016, his gains in 2016, and his vote share in 2020. However, this relationship did not hold for Trump's gains in 2020, when anti-Black bias was either unrelated or neg atively related to Trump performance. This result is consistent with the previous finding showing that Trump made gains in 2020 over his performance in 2016 in more ethnically diverse regions. Right-wing authoritarianism also consistently predicted Trump's vote share in 2016 and 2020. Unexpectedly, however, the relationship between right-wing authoritarianism and Trump's vote gains in 2016 and 2020 became negative in Model 3, which includes neuroticism and our structural factors. Contrary to past research, SDO and implicit gender bias did not consistently predict Trump voting.
Perhaps most importantly, the main effects of neuroticism, economic deprivation, ethnic diversity, and health disadvantage largely held when accounting for variables capturing group-based dominance. Moreover, the effect size of our focal variables were comparable to or larger than the effect size of the group-based dominance variables.

Analyses of the 2016 Primary Elections: Comparisons to Sanders, Kasich, Cruz, and Rubio
To investigate whether Trump's voter base is similar to that of other primary candidates, we analyzed Trump's vote share in the 2016 primary elections, comparing the character istics of regions that voted for Trump to those that voted for Bernie Sanders, John Kasich, Ted Cruz, and Marco Rubio. Results of these analyses are depicted in Table 7 and Table 8. They suggest some similarities but also notable differences between Trump's voter base and those of his competitors. 7 Beginning with comparisons between Sanders and Trump, more neurotic counties were indeed more likely to vote in 2016 for both Sanders (b = 1.04, p < .01) and Trump in the primaries (b = 1.11, p < .001). The same is true for the ethnic diversity factor where both Sanders (Model 4: b = -3.94, p < .001) and Trump in the general election received more votes in less ethnically diverse counties. However, neither economic disadvantage nor health conditions showed a clear relationship with Sanders's vote share, in contrast to the strong relationship of these factors with Trump in general election and partly in primary election voting. The maps in Figure 1 further show that the spatial distribution of neuroticism and economic disadvantage (marked in dark blue) overlap fairly substan tially with regions that voted for Trump but overlap to a much lesser extent with regions that voted for Sanders. 7) Note that we included five models in Table 6 rather than six models as we did in Table 4 and Table 5 because the fully saturated model with all interactions between independent variables and covariates did not show multicollinear ity issues. Therefore, we did not need to include a model that drops the interactions with covariates (Model 5 in Table  4 and Table 5).  Adjusted

Regressions on 2016 Primary Elections Votes (Counties) -Sanders and Trump
(3) (1) (3) (1) (3) (1) (3) (1) (3) (1) (3) (1) Note. OLS regressions at the county level. Independent variables were standardized. Regression coefficients and their 95% CIs are provided. All models include population density and state fixed effects as covariates. State fixed effects are not depicted for the sake of brevity. Model 1 only includes covariates. Model 2 includes main effects of the economic deprivation, ethnic diversity, and health disadvantage factors. Model 3 includes main effects of neuroticism, openness, and conscientiousness. Model 4 includes all main effects of neuroticism, openness, conscientiousness, and structural factors. Model 5 additionally includes neuroticism's interaction with the economic deprivation, ethnic diversity, and health disadvantage factors as well as interactions between all covariates (openness, conscientious ness, population density) and all three structural factors. 2016 Trump/Kasich/Cruz/Rubio Primary votes = share of Kasich/Cruz/Rubio votes as percentage of all votes for Republican primary candidates. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Figure 1
Regional Distribution of Neuroticism, Economic Deprivation, and Voting (Counties) Note. As described in the data section, counties with fewer than N = 100 respondents were dropped from the analysis and appear white on the maps. Trump 2016 gains = Gains in the two-party Republican vote share between the 2012 and 2016 elections; Trump 2020 gains = Gains in the two-party Republican vote share between the 2016 and 2020 elections. We include Sanders vote share in the 2016 primary elections as a point of comparison. In the maps depicting voting patterns, darker shades of blue represent greater vote shares and gains. In the Neuroticism x Economic Factor map (top left), dark blue represents counties that scored both above the median on neuroticism and above the median on economic deprivation; light blue represents counties that scored below the median on both neuroticism and economic deprivation; medium blue represents counties with either a combination of low neuroticism and high economic deprivation or high neuroticism and low economic deprivation.
Counties that voted for Sanders were also lower on conscientiousness (b = -1.40, p < .001), whereas counties that voted for Trump in 2016 tended to be lower on openness -a pattern not found in the Sander's primary election votes. Neuroticism also did not in teract significantly with any of the structural factors on Sanders's vote share. Moreover, despite the significant main effects mentioned above, it is worth noting that most of the variance in voting for Bernie Sanders in the 2016 Democratic primaries-66.8%-was accounted for by geographical factors: population density and state fixed effects. Taken together, regions that voted for Sanders were similar in some ways and different in others to regions that voted for Trump. It is also interesting to note the major differences between the Republican candidates in the primaries. Not a single independent variable consistently predicted voting for Republican primary candidates. Indeed, there is no overlap between the profile of regions that voted for Trump and those that voted for Rubio and Kasich. In fact, counties that voted for Kasich and Rubio tended to have less economic deprivation. However, the profile of counties that voted for Cruz is somewhat similar to those that voted for Trump in the general election, characterized by high neuroticism, low openness, high economic deprivation, and low ethnic diversity.
Interestingly, there are some differences between the determinants of Trump's 2016 general election voting share and his primary voting share. While neuroticism and economic deprivation are significant predictors in both elections, neither ethnic diversity, health disadvantage, nor openness predicted Trump's primary results. One reason for the discrepancies between primary and general election results could be that Trump's campaign changed somewhat over time to appeal to additional voting groups. A related interpretation is that the regions that contributed to Trump's nomination are not exactly the same as those that contributed to his general election win.

Summary of Findings with Robustness Checks
As noted in the Methods, spatial analyses require unique considerations such as includ ing appropriate controls like state fixed effects, as we included in the models reported above. In addition, we conducted robustness checks to account for spatial autocorrelation (by running analyses with spatial lags on the independent variables using the normalized inverse of distances between regions), the potential MAUP problem (by conducting analyses at the CBSA level), and non-representativeness of the personality data (by weighting respondents by age and gender). Full results of these analyses are reported in the Supplementary Materials and summarized in Table 9. Table 9 Summary  (Tables 4-6). Column 2 controls for spatial autocorrelation (Table  S6 and S7). Column 3 used weighted traits to improve representativeness of the personality sample (Tables  S9 and S10). Column 4 refers to regressions at the CBSA level (Tables S3 and S4). Column 5 controls for group-based dominance variables at the county level (Table 6), which did not include interaction terms (as indicated by /). + denotes positive significant effects at the p < .05 level. -denotes negative significant effects at the p < .05 level. Blank cells denote non-significant effects. See Supplementary Materials for further details.
As is evident from the table, the main effects of neuroticism and the structural factors on voting for Trump were consistent across nearly all robustness checks and dependent variables. Higher neuroticism, more economic disadvantage, and lower ethnic diversity predicted Trump voting. Worse health predicted more Trump gains but fewer Trump votes in 2016 and 2020. Of the 80 main effects of neuroticism and structural factors depicted in Table 9, only three robustness checks failed: Ethnic diversity did not predict Trump's vote share in 2016 and 2020 at the CBSA level, and neuroticism did predict Trump gains in 2020 in the spatial autocorrelation setting. We also note that neuroticism did not predict Trump gains in 2020, and greater ethnic diversity predicted Trump's gains in 2020, two findings which were consistent across robustness checks. In contrast to the robustness of the main effects, our focal interaction effects between neuroticism and the structural factors on Trump voting were less consistent and robust.

Discussion
To many observers, Donald Trump's rise was surprising, but the roots of his support corroborate foundational and modern theories of authoritarianism. Regions that were more prone to negative emotionality (as captured by higher neuroticism) and that were experiencing threatening structural conditions (as captured by 18 variables reflecting economic deprivation, lack of ethnic diversity, and health disadvantage) were those most likely to vote for Trump. In fact, regional neuroticism, economic deprivation, and lack of ethnic diversity predicted voting for Trump even after accounting for geo graphic confounds (e.g., population density, spatial autocorrelation), other personality traits (e.g., conscientiousness, openness), and measures of group-based dominance (e.g., social dominance orientation). Moreover, these findings generalized in exploratory and confirmatory pre-registered analyses, across regional levels (i.e., counties and CBSAs), to the population as a whole (i.e., when weights were used to make the sample more representative), and across election years (i.e., 2016 and 2020). The fact that the same kinds of regions were likely to vote for Trump in 2016 and 2020 demonstrates that these regions' preference was not merely for an anti-incumbent candidate. In short, both threat from internal psychological dispositions and external structural circumstances are robustly related to Trump voting (Onraet, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2014). Our findings with regard to neuroticism speak to a large and contradictory literature on the role of negativity bias and negative emotions in political behavior (Hibbing et al., 2014b;Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014a;Johnston & Madson, 2022). We highlight how neuroticism can be understood as a unifying pathway through which disparate negative emotions like fear and anger predict voting for leaders like Trump. At the same time, neuroticism is a stable trait, suggesting that enduring emotional dispositions, and not just fleeting affective states, have important implications for voting behavior. It is remarkable that a psychological disposition that, on its face, contains no political content is, at least under certain conditions, so strongly related to voting behavior. That said, neuroticism did not predict Trump's gains in 2020, perhaps because Trump support was already so high in these regions in 2016.
Neuroticism and threatening structural factors were not only robustly related to Trump voting, but they were also uniquely related to Trump voting. The kinds of regions that voted for Trump were different from the kinds of regions that voted for more traditional conservative candidates and for left-wing populist candidate Bernie Sanders. The first evidence for this claim comes from analyses comparing Trump's 2016 general election performance to the 2012 general election performance of previous Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney. Trump gained votes over Romney in regions high on neuroticism, economic deprivation, health disadvantage, and low on ethnic diversity, which suggests that Trump was more appealing to these regions than Romney was. The second set of analyses showing Trump's unique appeal compared his 2016 primary election performance to the performance of 2016 Republican primary candidates John Kasich, Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and 2016 Democratic primary candidate Bernie Sanders. There was no overlap between the characteristics of regions that voted for Trump and those that voted for Kasich and Rubio, although there was some overlap in the character istics of regions that voted for Trump and those that voted for rivals Cruz and Sanders. For example, unlike Kasich and Rubio who won votes in less economically deprived regions, both Trump and Cruz won more votes in more economically deprived regions. Similarly, both Trump and Sanders won more votes in less ethnically diverse regions in 2016. That said, regions that voted for Trump in the general election showed a unique confluence of characteristics. Only Trump won votes in regions experiencing high neu roticism, economic deprivation, and lack of ethnic diversity-some of the highest levels of psychological and structural threat we were able to capture. In short, Trump voting is not synonymous with right-wing voting nor with left-wing populist voting. The fact that regional levels of self-reported right-wing authoritarianism predicted Trump voting only reinforces this point.

History Does Not Repeat but It Rhymes
Our findings suggest that Trump voting can be conceptualized as authoritarian voting and is explained by an array of regional factors that vary psychologically and structur ally (Jost et al., 2003). Intellectually, this approach stems from the work of scholars from the Frankfurt School who sought to understand the roots of authoritarianism in the 20 th century. Our findings are particularly consonant with Frankfurt scholar Erich Fromm's work. In his book Escape from Freedom (1941), which he published after leaving Nazi Germany and a decade before Adorno and colleagues published The Authoritarian Personality, Fromm "bridges the gap between economics and psychology and shows how no theory which invokes only man's way of earning a living or man's human nature alone is sufficient, " according to a review by Margaret Mead (Fromm, 1956). Like Fromm -whose book was titled 'Fear' of Freedom in the UK-we emphasize the importance of negative emotions and structural conditions in explaining people's political choices The work of scholars like Fromm, who sought to explain the rise of Nazism in the 20th century, has striking parallels in the modern-day context. Trump's base may be different from the voter base of his contemporary political rivals. Still, his voter base is uncannily similar in some respects to the voter base of the historical figure who instiga ted the modern study of authoritarianism-Adolf Hitler. In particular, regions that voted for Trump were not those experiencing the greatest economic hardships, just as people who voted for Hitler were not those hardest hit by the Great Depression (King et al., 2008). Instead, both leaders found support among those who have suffered economically but still have further to fall. In Trump's case, these regions have a high share of agricul ture and manufacturing industries-regions that formerly drove the American economy but are struggling in the modern technology-based economy (as reflected by their low levels of income, college attainment, internet access, and migration). Importantly, these economically deprived regions are not those with the highest poverty or unemployment. Similarly, quantitative archival analyses of German voting records show that "those who were hurt by the economy but were at little risk of unemployment…constituted the groups that gave the most disproportionate support to the Nazis, " whereas "those who were unemployed or at high risk of becoming unemployed gave disproportionate support to the Communists or, to a lesser extent, to the Social Democrats" (King et al., 2008, pp. 952-953). That the working poor comprised much of the voter base of both Trump and Hitler is consistent with "last-place aversion" theories arguing that the second to last rung in the social ladder is a more psychological threatening position to occupy than the last rung (Gidron & Hall, 2017;Kuziemko et al., 2014).
Our factor analytic method painted a broad portrait of the threatening economic conditions that explain Trump's vote share and his performance gains over time. But one variable from the economic deprivation factor stood out: college degree attainment. An examination of zero-order correlations showed that lack of college attainment corre lated more strongly than any other variable with Trump's vote share in 2016 and 2020, Trump's gains in 2016 over Romney's performance in 2012, and Trump's gains in 2020 over his previous performance in 2016. Therefore, boosting rates of college attainment by increasing college enrollment or retention (e.g., Talaifar et al., 2021) might be an important way to mitigate the threat of authoritarianism in the U.S. (Scott, 2022). This strategy is likely to be particularly effective because higher education improves other economic outcomes (Chetty et al., 2020) and racial attitudes (Wodtke, 2012(Wodtke, , 2018.

Intertwined Economic and Racial Roots of Trump Voting
As might be evident from the historical example described in the previous section, economic deprivation in Trump-supporting regions must be understood in the context of white people's perceptions that minorities' status is increasing and the antipathy that can result from such perceptions (Craig & Richeson, 2014;Wetts & Willer, 2018). Trump voting was not only disproportionally concentrated in regions that were high on economic deprivation but also in regions high on anti-Black bias and low ethnic diversity. That said, Trump voting was not higher in regions that had higher gender implicit bias or a more general preference for social inequality, as measured by social dominance orientation 8 . Together, these results suggest that purely economic accounts of Trump voting are insufficient and that antipathy toward specific ethnic minority groups is associated with Trump voting. 8) In addition, the economic deprivation factor (which was positively associated with Trump voting) was character ized by lower, not higher, income inequality. This may seem inconsistent with evidence that economic inequality undermines democracy and enhances support for strong leaders (e.g., Andersen, 2012;Sprong et al., 2019). Future research should examine whether such inconsistencies can be explained by differences in the level of analysis at which income inequality is measured. National inequality levels may be more predictive of preference for a strong leader than local levels. Importantly, our method was not designed to determine the relative influence eco nomic deprivation versus racial resentment, as these factors are so intimately intertwined (McGovern, Kirkland, & Blake, 2021). For instance, White people interpret race relations as a zero-sum game, such that their economic hardships are viewed as minorities' gains (Norton & Sommers, 2011). Another example of how economics and race relations are intertwined comes from research showing that contact with ethnic minorities may im prove Whites' attitudes towards minorities and decrease their Trump support, but only in the context of economic prosperity (Knowles & Tropp, 2018). Therefore, claiming that one structural factor is more important than another is overly simplistic. Instead, a strength of our work is its synthesis of economic, racial, and health factors, showing that threatening circumstances of many kinds jointly predict voting behavior. Indeed, to reflect the fact that economic, demographic, and health-related conditions are enmeshed in the real world, all our variables were allowed to load on all three factors, and factors were allowed to correlate with each other.
Our analyses show that more ethnically diverse regions preferred Democratic presi dential candidates Clinton in 2016 and Biden in 2020, and that ethnically diverse regions were less likely to vote for Trump than they were to vote for Mitt Romney in 2012. However, Trump performance improved in ethnically diverse regions, and anti-Black implicit bias did not positively predict Trump's gains in 2020 the way it did in 2016. Further work is needed to understand why Trump's performance improved in ethnically diverse regions. One possible explanation is that the Republican effort in 2020 to paint Democratic rival Joe Biden as a socialist might have been effective in provoking fear among some Hispanic community members who may have had experience with socialist regimes in their countries of origin (e.g., Cuba, Venezuela). Another interpretation is more mundane -Trump may have already been so popular in ethnically homogenous regions that the only places where he could improve his performance were ethnically diverse.
Regarding regions high on health disadvantage, Democratic presidential candidates in 2016 and 2020 outperformed Trump in these regions overall. This finding is consistent with theories arguing that people vote for the leaders that they believe can best address the given threat at hand (Brandt & Bakker, 2022;Eadeh & Chang, 2020), since Democrats have typically been those to expand access to healthcare. But once again, Trump seems to be improving his performance in regions with poor health. He performed better in regions high on health disadvantage in 2020 than he did in 2016, and health disadvantage predicted Trump's vote gains in 2016 over Romney's performance in 2012.

Psychological Roots of Trump Support
Prior research shows an inconsistent relationship between neuroticism and right-wing voting behavior. Only recently has this relationship been robustly empirically documen ted (Obschonka et al., 2018). The recency and inconsistency of this link suggests that neuroticism may only be related to right-wing voting under certain threat-activating circumstances. We do not find strong evidence for this moderation hypothesis. Trump voting does not seem to be the result of regional neuroticism exacerbating the effects of threatening structural conditions, or of structural conditions activating the latent threatsensitivity of regions high on neuroticism. Instead, we find that regional neuroticism and threatening structural conditions contribute in an additive rather than interactive way to Trump's vote share and gains. This additive effect may seem surprising, but classic theories arguing that behavior is a function of both psychological and environmental factors did not specify exactly how psychological and environmental factors will combine to predict behavior (Kihlstrom, 2013;Lewin, 1951).
One promising avenue for future research would be to examine interactions at differ ent levels of analysis. For instance, regional neuroticism may interact with threatening national conditions to predict voting behavior. Alternatively, individuals' neuroticism may interact with threatening regional conditions to predict voting behavior. Important ly, individual voting behavior might have different antecedents than regional voting behavior. From the present research, we can only conclude that psychological and struc tural characteristics of one's county and CBSA-not individual neuroticism or personal perceptions of threat-predict regional voting behavior. Drawing conclusions about indi viduals from this paper would be committing the ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950). Moreover, it is possible that neuroticism has an opposite relationship to political behav ior at the individual and regional levels. An individual's own neuroticism may predict less voting for Trump (Fortunato et al., 2018;Samek, 2017) while living in a region with many other people experiencing high levels of negative emotionality (independent of one's own experience) may predict more voting for Trump.
When it comes to other personality traits, openness and conscientiousness have, in past research, been most strongly linked to political ideology at the individual and regional levels (e.g., Garretsen et al., 2018;Gerber et al., 2010). Lack of openness to experience at the regional level was indeed robustly related to Trump's vote share in 2016 and 2020, similar to prior research. But lack of openness was not consistently rela ted to Trump's gains over Romney, gains over his own performance, or voting for any primary candidate other than Cruz. Similarly, lack of conscientiousness at the regional level did negatively predict voting for Sanders, as expected. However, regional levels of conscientiousness were not consistently related to voting for Trump or other primary Republican candidates. We do not have a ready explanation for these findings, other than the fact that the strength of structural factors-explaining 25-40% of variance in voting-may overwhelm the ability of any single variable to explain even more regional variance in voting. That said, regional neuroticism consistently predicted Trump voting beyond the large effects of these structural variables.

Limitations
Although we attempted to control for a wide variety of potential confounds, the most obvious limitation of this work is the lack of evidence for a causal role for psychological and structural factors on Trump voting. Indeed, recent research suggests that personality traits and political preferences can influence each other bidirectionally (Bakker, Lelkes, & Malka, 2021;Luttig, 2021). Moreover, one recent study showed that exposure to au thoritarian speeches and messages causally increases meaning in life (Womick et al., 2021) but actually lowers positive affect and increases negative affect. If this is the case, then authoritarianism may support people's existential needs even as it worsens their emotional experience or, over the long-term, their neuroticism.
Moreover, the factors we studied are highly stable over time at the regional level, suggesting that the roots of Trump support have been long in the making (as was also the case for the roots of Nazi support; De Bromhead, Eichengreen, & O'Rourke, 2013). Such stable structural variables cannot be easily manipulated by experimenters. Even if feasible, manipulating psychological and structural factors in the lab or the field to influence voting behavior would likely be unethical. One possible solution would be to leverage quasi-natural experiments. For example, economists have made causal inferen ces about the influence of trade with China on voting by exploiting the quasi-random regional distribution of import competition (e.g., Autor et al., 2020).
Neuroticism and threatening economic, demographic, and health conditions are not the only psychological and structural variables that may explain Trump support. With regard to psychological variables, we emphasized the role of "hot" emotional factors, but "cold" cognitive factors like cognitive ability and rigidity have also played a role in recent voting behavior (Choma & Hanoch, 2017;Ganzach, Hanoch, & Choma, 2019;Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2018). Moreover, there are other personality traits (e.g., the Dark Triad) and measures of group-based dominance (e.g., explicit hostile and benev olent sexism) that we did not examine but which have been linked to Trump support (Glick, 2019;Yalch, 2021). Regarding structural factors, we emphasized the role of fairly enduring structural factors rather than more immediate features of the electoral context, such as media coverage (Reuning & Dietrich, 2019) or the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic (Baccini, Brodeur, & Weymouth, 2021;Clarke, Stewart, & Ho, 2021), which some researchers have argued accounted for Trump's win in 2016 and loss in 2020, respectively. We also did not consider the role of political polarization or threats from the outparty, foreign actors, or climate change, which may also increase authoritarianism (Fritsche et al., 2012;Graham & Svolik, 2020;Stanley & Wilson, 2019). One especially important avenue for future research is to understand how social media platforms and misinformation may amplify or manufacture the salience of all of these threats while allowing people to avoid information that challenges their political views (Ashokkumar et al., 2020).
One limitation of our analytic approach is that it ignores third party votes, which might have an influential effect on election outcomes. Furthermore, our focus was on predicting voting for Trump, but vote choice is just one component of what determines election outcomes (Grimmer & Marble, 2019). Voter turnout is also important for deter mining the winner of an election. Turnout in the 2020 election was much higher than in 2016 for both parties, but Democrats increased turn out more than Republicans did. Future research could investigate whether neuroticism and threatening structural varia bles also predict voter turnout. Evidence that anger is a critical negative emotion driving turnout (Lambert, Eadeh, & Hanson, 2019) suggests that neuroticism, which is associated with anger (Maciantowicz & Zajenkowski, 2020), may also be related to greater voter turnout. However, existing research on neuroticism seems to show that neuroticism is actually related to lower voter turnout and other forms of political participation (Gerber et al., 2011b).

Conclusion
Around the world voters in democratic regimes are electing leaders who "routinely ignore constitutional limits on their power" (Zakaria, 1997, p. 22). The election of Trump, who flouted an array of democratic norms, was perhaps the most conspicuous example of this trend. Even after losing the 2020 election, Trump maintained a strong hold on the Republican party, with some polls estimating that more than 70% of Republicans thought he should run for president again (Rakich & Wilkes, 2021). Here, we proposed that researchers must consider both psychological and structural factors to gain a holistic un derstanding of the roots of Trump's appeal. We find that the prevalence of neuroticism in a region and its threatening economic, demographic, and health conditions both predict voting for Trump in 2016 and 2020. It remains to be seen whether other authoritarian leaders will emerge to capitalize on these same psychological and structural dynamics in the U.S. and elsewhere.